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By The Honorable Marvin B. Steinberg,
Tracy K. Garapolo and Gloria A. Worch
Upon taking their oath of office, trial judges assume the
duty of conducting trials through a fair process calculated to
ascertain the truth while achieving justice within reasonable
costs. Furthermore, judges are expected to remain fair and
impartial in both their conduct and rulings. In large part, the
motions and requests of counsel prompt the rulings judges
make prior to, during, and following the actual trial. None-
theless, in certain situations judges have the authority to act
sua sponte.
The term "sua sponte" means taking action of one's
"own will or motion voluntarily, without prompting or
suggestion."2 In court proceedings, "sua sponte" refers to
a trial judge acting, without being requested, on his or her
own volition. A sua sponte ruling by a judge is appropriate
provided such action is called for by a manifest necessity.
The parameters of sua sponte conduct have presented
difficulties for trial judges in recent years, with appellate
courts continuously defining and redefining what constitutes
a manifest necessity. On the one hand, the risk of a reversal
looms when a judge fails to act under circumstances which
require judicial intervention. On the other hand, if the judge
acts when he or she should not have acted, the result would
be the barring of a subsequent criminal trial on double
jeopardy grounds, and a possible reversal on other grounds
in a civil case. The purpose of this article is to discuss when
there is or is not manifest necessity in various contexts and
to identify useful guidelines for the trial judge in determining
when such conduct is appropriate.
I. Manifest Necessity
A "judge has the inherent discretion to declare a mistrial
sua sponte or to declare it pursuant to the State's motion,
[and] he or she may declare a mistrial over the defendant's
objection or without the defendant's acquiescence." 3 A trial
judge has "the authority to discharge a jury from giving any
verdict, whenever, in [his or her] opinion, taking all the
circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest neces-
sity for the act, or the ends of the public justice would
otherwise be defeated."
M
In addressing the issue of manifest necessity, the Su-
preme Court has "explicitly declined the invitations of
litigants to formulate rules based on categories of circum-
stances which will permit or preclude retrial."' The Court
has stated, however, that when deciding whether a manifest
necessity existed, an appellate court must examine the trial
as "viewed in the light of the particular problem confronting
the trial judge."'6 Furthermore, an appellate court should
"accord the highest decree of respect to the trial judge's
evaluation" regarding the manifest necessity to declare
mistrial.7
Whether upon request or sua sponte, the decision to
declare or not to declare a mistrial in a criminal case requires
the trial judge to consider well established double jeopardy
principles, which, inter alia, dictate that where a trial is
needlessly aborted, the defendant cannot be retried.' Mary-
land, however, like the federal courts, has not adopted a clear
formula for determining when there is a manifest necessity
for the declaration of a mistrial. As a result, the courts may
differ in their analyses regarding whether a particular occur-
rence at a trial warrants such declaration.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has expressly de-
clined to place significant limits on the capacity of trial
judges to declare a mistrial on their own volition in a criminal
case. In Crutchfield v. State,9 the court of appeals reversed
a decision by the court of special appeals which attempted to
restrict the trial court's power to declare a mistrial sua
sponte. During the trial in Crutchfield, the substance of
statements made by the defendant was admitted into evidence
despite the fact that the statements were made during a
custodial interrogation without the defendant having been
advised of herMiranda rights. The trial judge recognized the
potential damage to the defendant's case and advised counsel
to move for amistrial. Defense counsel declinedto do so, and
further stated his intentions "to move for a dismissal if the
court declared a mistrial without [the defendant's] con-
sent."' 0 The trial judge declared a mistrial sua sponte, over
the objection of the defense.
On appeal, the court of special appeals held that there
was no indication of "a manifest.., necessity for the trial
judge to have aborted the trial."" Furthermore, the interme-
diate court concluded that the defendant should be the person
to determine "whether a mistrial is necessary to protect [his
4 - U. Bait. L.F. / 24.3
or her] interest."' 2 Reasoning that "great deference should
be given [to the defendant's] determination as to whether his
own interests would be better served by aborting the trial or
by submittinghis fate to thejury that is already impaneled,"' 3
the court of special appeals overturned the trial court's
decision to declare a mistrial.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial judge
had properly exercised his authority in declaring a mistrial
under these circumstances, even over the defendant's objec-
tion. Rejecting the view expressed by the court of special
appeals which favored deference to the wishes of the defen-
dant, the court of appeals reasoned that the effect of placing
the ultimate determination with the defendant and not the trial
judge would be to render "the trial judge a useless appendage
in the judgmental process of determining whether a mistrial
was manifestly necessary in the interest of public justice."' 4
II. Guidelines
Although there are no rigid federal or state standards for
explicitly defining manifest necessity, case
law does provide some guidance in deter-
mining when a manifest necessity exists. By de
As an overriding principle, it is important
to keep in mind that "there are [varying] a m,
degrees ofnecessity and.. a'high degree' sua
[is required] before concluding that a mis-
trial is appropriate."' 5  o o o a
Before declaring a mistrial, the trial need
judge must determine whether an error
that has occurred is so egregious that the cognizt
defendant cannot continue to have a fair
trial once the error has been committed.' 6  danger
If the trial judge correctly makes such a ing bit
determination, the requisite manifest ne-
cessity then exists and the court should, of the
sua sponte, abort the trial. By declaring a
mistrial sua sponte, however, ajudge needs
to be cognizant of the danger of showing
bias to one of the parties. Case law has emphasized that a
trial judge should not declare a mistrial if there are less
drastic alternatives available to the court. For example, the
trial judge should consider the option of giving a curative
instruction, as opposed to declaring a mistrial sua sponte, if
such an instruction can effectively remedy the error. 7
In many instances, however, no feasible alternative
exists and a trial judge is compelled to declare a mistrial sua
sponte. Sua sponte declarations of a mistrial, based upon
manifest necessity, have been upheld in a variety of circum-
stances. The situations in which a trial judge must decide
whether to declare a mistrial include: 1) after some testimony
mistakenly comes in that is highly prejudicial to the defen-
dant; 2) following the presentation of improper instructions
to the jury; 3) plain error; 4) a hung jury; 5) unfair prejudice
against the accused; and 6) absent witnesses. To avoid
reversal, the trial judge must guard against abusing his or her
discretion through inaction as well. Accordingly, appellate
review of such sua sponte conduct or lack thereof may be
warranted.
A. Error in Testimony
The first situation which may warrant a trial court's sua
sponte declaration of a mistrial involves error occurring
when the jurors acquire prejudicial information during a
witness's testimony at trial. In Bailey v. State,'8 three of the
State's witnesses at the defendant's second trial referred to
the first trial during the course of their testimony. Defense
counsel did not object to the first witness's reference to the
previous trial. 9 When the second witness made a similar
reference, however, defense counsel requested a mistrial.
20
The trial judge declined to take such action. Although willing
to give a cautionary instruction, the trial judge expressed
concern that doing so would only emphasize the first trial.2'











conviction at the first trial, the trial judge sua
sponte declared a mistrial.2 2  The
declaration of a mistrial was upheld on
appeal based upon a finding of manifest
necessity. The court reasoned that "when
prejudicial information is acquired by ju-
rors during trial, there is a high risk that
the prejudicial information will be held
against the accused."23
Conversely, other appellate cou rts
have found that, in certain instances, trial
courts abused their discretion by declaring
a mistrial sua sponte after the jury heard
unfairly prejudicial testimony. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Evers,24 the
defendant was being prosecuted for fed-
eral income tax evasion. The trial judge
sua sponte declared a mistrial after one of
the witnesses for the prosecution sug-
gested that the source of unreported in-
come might have been from campaign contributions. The
appellate court found that manifest necessity did not exist in
this situation, concluding that thejudge should have opted to
use a curative instruction to remove any possible juror
prejudice that might have arisen from the remark.
25
B. Error in Jury Instructions
The issue of error may additionally arise in the course of
the trial judge's presentation of instructions to the jury.
Maryland Rule 4-325(a) states that the "court shall give
instructions to the jury.. . ." (emphasis added). Advisory
instructions are required, however, "only where a request for
such instructions is made,'2 6 providing there is an evidentiary
and legal basis for the instruction. In Stanley v. State27 the
trial judge asked counsel if there were any requests for
instructions. Because neither counsel made such a request,
the court of special appeals held that the defendant "waived
his right to have the jury instructed . . . and cannot . . .
24.3/U. Bait. L.F. - 5
complain about the absence of such instruction."2 8 How-
ever, in view of Glover v. State,29 it appears that had the trial
judge not asked counsel, unlike Stanley where such a request
was made, proceeding without any instruction could well be
reversible error.
Jury instructions are proper when they are "articulated
fairly and impartially."3 "[W]hen the instructions are lack-
ing in some vital detail or convey some prejudicial or
confusing message,... the ability of the jury to discharge its
duty of returning a true verdict based on the evidence is
impaired."'3' In State v. Hutchinson,32 for example, plain
error occurred when the failure to give a not guilty option,
excluded the possibility of a not guilty verdict, although the
instructions did include various degrees of guilty verdicts.33
A trial judge is obligated to present a correct instruction
to thejury even though atechnically incorrect instruction was
requested by counsel. In Glover v. State,34 a question arose
as to whether or not a trial judge was obligated to correct a
technically erroneous jury instruction. The defense counsel
requested an instruction relating to
"fresh pursuit." The requested instruc-
tion specifically dealt with interstate A trial1
pursuit, which was in error because the obligated i
matter at hand dealt with intrastate
pursuit. The trial judge refused to give a correct i
the instruction, voicing concern that it
might confuse the jury. Although de- to the
fense counsel objected, it made no sug- even tht
gestion of an instruction on "intrastate"
pursuit. While it is not error for a trial techni
judge to refuse to grant a requested
instruction which may mislead thejury, inco
the appellate court held that, in a case instruct
such as the one at bar, the trial judge
should have given the correct instruc- reques
tion sua sponte, i.e., he should have
changed the requested "interstate" in- COUn
struction to "intrastate."3  Offering
some guidance, the court of special appeals in Glover devised
a principle for determining whether a requested jury instruc-
tion is potentially misleading or technically erroneous: "[i]f
the premise of the instruction requested by the defendant is
relevant and sanctioned by law, rather than one contrary to
it, a circuit court has an obligation to instruct on the point
even if the language of the instruction offered by the defen-
dant is in some respects erroneous. 36
C. Plain Error
Under the plain error rule, a legal doctrine which may
also warrant sua sponte conduct, obvious errors which arise
during the course of a judicial proceeding and which affect
the substantive rights of a party "may be considered on
motion for a new trial or on appeal though not raised in [the]
trial court if manifest injustice or miscarriage ofjustice has
resulted... ."I "Any error, once recognized, may be called
plain error, and unless it can be held to be harmless, it must
be considered as material to the rights of the accused. 38
"The plain error rule evolved as an exception to the
general rule that points or questions not raised at trial will not
be considered on appeal." '39 Prior to 1825, the court of
appeals was required to examine any error in the record from
the trial court, regardless of whether or not such error was
brought to the attention of the trial judge.4° Following an
1825 legislative enactment, the court of appeals possessed
authority to examine only those issues which had been
adjudicated at the trial level.4  Although that statutory
principal is strictly followed in civil actions, appellate courts
have greater flexibility in criminal matters to address issues
not previously raised at the trial .42 Such flexibility has been
attributed to the need to protect the defendant's rights in
situations "where errors are likely to have more serious
consequences.'4











appellate court will not decide any issue
[other than subject-matter jurisdiction]
unless it plainly appears by the record to
have been raised in or decided by the
trial court .... The rule encourages
efficient judicial administration by
"avoiding the expense and delay of ap-
peals and new trials based on errors that
might have been corrected by the trial
court. '4 Consequently, the failure of a
party to raise an issue in a timely manner
during the course of the trial generally
constitutes a waiver ofthat issue. 46 Like-
wise, the failure to raise an issue to the
appellate court in brief or argument is
usually also deemed a waiver as to the
issue.47
- Despite the judicially recognized
view disfavoring review on appeal of
issues not raised at the trial level, the plain error rule permits
an appellate court, upon its own motion and without any
prompting from counsel, to "take cognizance of [and cor-
rect] any plain error . . . material to the rights of the
defendant" even though there was no objection made to the
error at the trial.48 An error may be classified as material
if it affects the rights of the accused to a "fair and impartial
trial. '49 Sua sponte acts of appellate courts are especially
instructive for trial judges because it can safely be assumed
that the appellate court, by rendering a sua sponte ruling,
would not only have condoned such action at trial, but likely
would have deemed it necessary for the trial judge to have
raised and ruled on the same issue as well.
There is no fixed formula to ascertain when plain error
has occurred such that it may be addressed on appeal.50
Factors for consideration include "whether the error was
6 - U. Bait. L.F. / 24.3
purely technical, the product of conscious design or trial
tactics or the result of bald inattention... [T]hese factors.
. are ordinarily inconsistent with circumstances justifying
an appellate court's intervention."' In deciding whether a
reviewable plain error exists, an appellate court may be
guided by a three-part test: 1) is there an unobjected-to error
readily apparent on the face of the record?; 2) is the error of
such aprejudicial nature that "it is material to the rights of
the accused?"52; and 3) is the error "sufficiently serious or
harmful to merit review in the absence of a trial objection?"53
Recently in Austin v. State,54 the court of special appeals
discussed four factors an appellate court might consider in
determining whether to exercise its discretion in reviewing
plain error not raised at the trial level. The first consideration
concerns the egregiousness of the error, which does not
include "mere misstatements of the law."55  A second
motivation for appellate review involves the impact of the
error upon the defendant. The court is likely to review an
error under this second factor "only where
[the appellate court is] persuaded that the
error probably did have a crucial bearing a lo
upon the verdict. 56 Furthermore, the
burden is upon the defendant to prove that court,
error did have an adverse impact. Under greaterj
the third consideration, diligence of coun-
sel, or "the degree of dereliction of the 1
attorney in not making timely objection to
an erroneous instruction" may influence crimina
the appellate court's decision regarding to addrt
review.57 The fourth and final consider-
ation, according to the court, concerns notpri
whether the case is a vehicle in which ra
review is "necessary to serve the ends of
fundamental fairness and substantial jus- at th
tice" beyond the concerns of the particu-
lar case at hand.5"
Although the above-mentioned con-
siderations may influence the appellate court's decision to
review plain error, "[tihe touchstone remains, as it always
has been, ultimate and unfettered discretion" of the court.59
Unfortunately, such a "touchstone" is of limited assistance
to a trial judge attempting to determine if sua sponte action
is warranted in a particular instance.
There is a persuasive counter-argument as to why an
appellate court should not always consider a lack of sua
sponte action on the part ofa trial judge to be reviewable plain
error. In his dissent in Hutchinson,' Judge Smith reasoned
that "an appellate court should not take cognizance of 'plain
error' on its own motion if the alleged error was one which
could be corrected readily if brought to the trial judge's
attention."61 Under certain circumstances, it may be part of
defense counsel's strategy to waive the defendant's constitu-
tional right to object to errors arising during the course of the
trial. 62 "[A]n attorney might very well sit quietly by when an
's
P1
obvious error. arises saying to himself that if the jury in
its wisdom does not acquit his client, then he has in the record
a ground for appellate reversal."63
"[T]he exercise of our discretion to correct [plain error]
should be limited to those cases in which correction is
necessary to serve the ends of fundamental fairness and
substantial justice."'6 Plain error should "not include bad
guesses by counsel whether or not to object to anything done
or left undone by the court.
'65
Similarly, the admission of erroneously admitted evi-
dence does not necessarily invoke the plain error rule. "[A]
failure to object to an offer of evidence at the time the offer
is made . . . is a waiver upon appeal of any ground of
complaint against its admission. "66 At issue in Mack v.
United States was whether the "trial judge erred by failing
to intervene sua sponte to assure the exclusion of...
hearsay. '67 Hearsay testimony which was damaging to the
defendant had been admitted during the trial. The trial judge
recognized the impropriety of the testi-
mony and advised defense counsel to ob-
t ellate ject. Counsel offered no objection. The
appellate court held that the trial judge did
have not commit "plain error" by not taking









Maryland Rule 4-323(a) adheres
to this same principle, stating that: "[an
objection to the admission of evidence
shall be made at the time the evidence is
offered or as soon thereafter as the grounds
for objection become apparent. Other-
wise, the objection is waived. '68
D. Hung Jury
In addition to a trial judge's ability
to declare a mistrial sua sponte based
upon error, the court may declare a mis-
trial if there is a hungjury. The hung jury
is "considered to be the classic example of what constitutes
manifest necessity for a mistrial." 69 The Supreme Court has
held "that the trial judge may discharge a genuinely dead-
locked jury and require the defendant to submit to a second
trial.""
In Hankins v. State,7' the jury had deliberated for
approximately three hours when it informed the trial judge
that it had not reached a unanimous decision. The judge
instructed the jury to continue deliberation as requested by
both counsel. 2 Less than one hour later, the jury made an
inquiry as to how long it would be required to remain in
deliberation.73 Although the court and the prosecutor be-
lieved the jury to be deadlocked, defense counsel, objecting
to the declaration of a mistrial, requested that the jury be
allowed to continue to deliberate after a recess until the
following morning.7 4 Instead of adopting defense counsel's
suggestion, the court decided to ask the jury whether it would
24.3/U. Bait. L.F. - 7
be able to reach a verdict if given more time." When the jury
responded in the negative, the trial judge declared a mis-
trial.76 The court of special appeals held that the trial judge
acted within his discretion in deciding that allowing the jury
to continue deliberations would be futile." As a manifest
necessity existed for the trial judge to declare a mistrial in the
appellant's first trial, the doublejeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment did not preclude a retrial. 8
There is no minimum length of time that a jury must
remain in deliberation before a mistrial may be declared.79
When it becomes obvious to the trial judge "that continued
deliberation.., would be futile," then he or she may correctly
declare a mistrial8s0 As a mater of practice, the trial judge
should note for the record the length of the trial and the length
of the jury deliberations. The trial judge should also make
some inquiry as to the likelihood of the jury reaching a
verdict.
E. Prejudice
A third category of cases in which appellate courts have
upheld a trial judge's sua sponte declaration of a mistrial
based upon manifest necessity occurs
when prejudice arises during the course
of the trial. Any occurrence which has
the potential ofcreating prejudice against Prejudic
the accused may warrant the declaration th a
of a mistrial. For example, manifest
necessity exists "where ajuror has pos- may ar,
sibly been biased or the juror's impar-
tiality is questionable."8' A trial court's imp]
declaration of a mistrial was upheld remar)
when the "jurors accidently met four
co-defendants at an elevator [where] the dur,
co-defendants were heavily shackled,
chained together and guarded by a con- COUl
tingent of United States Marshals. 8 2 If the
the potentially prejudicial event is minor
or only a quickly passing scene, the trial
judge should inquire of the jurors individually what, if
anything, they saw or heard and if those observations would




Prejudice against the accused may arise from improper
remarks made during the course of the trial. When an
improper remark has been made but not objected to by
opposing counsel, the issue arises as to whether the trial
judge should take action sua sponte to correct the comment.
Generally, the answer is "no." However, to be on safe
ground, the trial judge should ask counsel for a conference
out of the presence of the jury to inquire into the prejudicial
nature of the statement.
Upon determining that an improper remark was made to
the detriment of the accused during the trial, an appellate
court will examine "whether the trial court took appropriate
action to overcome a likelihood of prejudice... .,"I4 How the
trial court handles such a remark may determine whether
there is cause for reversal of the judgment.8" Certainly,
counsel may make an objection to an improper remark if done
so in a timely manner so as to give the court an opportunity
to take corrective measures.
"Generally the prosecutor has an obligation to refrain
from making any remark wiihin the hearing of thejury which
is likely or apt to instigate prejudice against the accused."86
The court should examine a questionable remark for its effect
upon thejury. If thejury was possibly influenced against the
defendant as a result of the remark, then a conviction might
be reversed. To warrant a reversal, "[i]mproper conduct or
remarks made by the state during a prosecution would have
to be a direct and contributing factor that resulted in substan-
tial prejudice to the defendant." 7
In 1rick v. United States,"8 the defendant sought a
reversal of his conviction based upon prosecutorial miscon-
duct that occurred during his trial.8 9 After determining that
misconduct did occur, the appellate court
then considered "the gravity of the mis-
conduct, its relationship to the issue of
e against guilt, the effect of any corrective action
,cused by the trial judge, and the strength of the
government's case." The court wentrsefrom on to state that where the defendant has
failed to object to the prosecutorial mis-
'oper conduct during the course of the trial, as
:s made was the case here, his conviction will be
reversed only "if the misconduct so
zg the clearly prejudiced his substantial rights
as to jeopardize the fairness and integ-Se of rity of his trial."'91 The court acknowl-
trial edged that when misconduct might re-
sult in "substantial prejudice, thejudge
should consider convening a bench con-
ference sua sponte, even during argument, to protect a
litigant from prejudice. ' 92 The court, however, viewed the
particular case subjudice as "hardly a situation so extreme
that it required or even warranted intervention by the judge
in the absence of an objection .... 9
In Brinand v. Denzik,94 the appellant failed to make a
timely objection to the improper remarks made by the
appellee's counsel during closing arguments. 9 Although
conceding that the remarks in question may have indeed been
improper, the court of appeals nonetheless affirmed the lower
court's denial of appellant's motion for a new trial. "The
appellant did not ask the trial court to declare a mistrial when
the remarks were made, and did not then or at any time before
the jury retired request the court to instruct the jury to
disregard them. This being so, the appellant was deemed to
have waived her right to object to the verdict." '6 "In the
A
i
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absence of any further action by appellant [to protect herself
from potential prejudice resulting from the improper re-
marks], there was no duty upon the trial court to make further
reference to the matter.
9 7
Case history provides examples of the effect of improper
remarks made during the course of the trial. For instance,
"[a]n appeal to racial or religious prejudice is improper."
Also improper are "remarks as to the right of appeal and the
possibility of executive clemency and parole of the defen-
dant."99 "It is improper for the prosecutor to assert his
personal belief or personal conviction as to the guilt of the
accused, if that belief or conviction is predicated upon
anything other than the evidence in the case. .. -100 A
prosecutor is acting improperly when he or she encourages
the jury to consider prior convictions of a defendant in
reaching a verdict.''
"[W]hen passion and prejudice are heightened by emo-
tions stirred during wartime, a prosecutor's reference, in his
closing argument, to the war as being,
wholly irrelevant to any facts or issues
in the case," were held to be im- The faili
proper.02 Here, the defendant was on
trial for allegedly violating a statutory action si
provision which called for the "regis- may in s
tration of certain agents of foreign
principals."'01 3 The reference by the form the
prosecutor to the "harsh, cruel, mur-
derous war" was clearly done to in- determij
voke prejudice against the accused.1' the ap
The Supreme Court stated in dicta that
"the trial judge should have stopped CoUrts thi
counsel's discourse without waiting judge a
for an objection."' 10 5
Conduct or her d
Manifest necessity for the sua
sponte declaration of a mistrial has
also been upheld in a case where the
defendant's conduct displayed such "obvious hostility to the
judge's rulings [that it] could not help but influence the
jury."' '6 The appellate court in State v. Brady indicated that
although "the judge had ruled quickly, . . . [he did not act]
without consideration.'107 The trial judge, after assessing the
impact of the defendant's conduct upon the jury, believed
that there was no alternative other than to declare a mis-
trial.'0 8
F. Absent Witnesses
Yet another indication for determining whether a mani-
fest necessity for declaring a mistrial exists is whether there
are less drastic measures available. "[W]here reasonable
alternatives to a mistrial, such as a continuance, are feasible
and could cure the problem," the judge should not declare a
mistrial.109
It has been held that the absence of a key witness for the
prosecution did not constitute a manifest necessity for a
mistrial." 0 Cornero v. United States"I set forth the general
rule regarding the appropriate course of action a trial judge
should follow when witnesses are absent from trial. In
Cornero, the court noted that no previous court had held
"that, after impanelment of the jury,. . . the failure of the
district attorney to have present sufficient witnesses, or
evidence to prove the offense charged, is an exception to the
rule that the discharge of the jury.., operates as a protection
against retrial of the same case."
'"12
In Downum v. United States, 3I I the Supreme Court held,
in a 5-4 decision, that former jeopardy attached when the
prosecution successfully requested that the first jury, which
was already sworn, be discharged because a key witness, in
two of the six counts charged against the defendant, was not
present. A second jury was impaneled two days later when
the case was again called. Although the trial court denied the










that the plea should have been sus-
tained. The Court noted that the pros-
ecution, "allowed the jury to be se-
lected and sworn even though one of its
key witnesses was absent and had not
been found.""l4 Furthermore, the pros-
ecution could have dismissed the two
counts for which the missing witness
was needed, and proceeded on the re-
maining four counts.
Other courts, however, have re-
fused to acknowledge the inflexible
rule which states that "the absence of a
witness can never justify the discon-
tinuance of a trial.""' 5 Adhering to
such a rule would violate the principles
set forth in United States v. Perez,"
6
which provided that the determination
of whether there was a manifest neces-
sity for the declaration of a mistrial must be assessed on a
case-by-case basis. A situation similar to Downum arose in
United States v. Khait,' where the court held that the
defendant's second trial was not barred by double jeopardy
when the first trial ended in a mistrial due to the unavailability
of a witness. In Khait, a key witness was absent not as a
result of an oversight of the prosecutor, but rather because of
threats made upon family members ofthe witness in an effort
to keep the witness from testifying. The district court
distinguished the case before it from Downum in that the
latter case involved fault on the part of the prosecution for
"failing to arrange for the witness's presence, whereas in this
case the government had no control" over the witness's
refusal to testify.'' 8
G. Abuse of Discretion
The failure to take action sua sponte may in some cases
24.3/U. Bait. L.F. - 9
form the basis of a determination by the appellate courts that
the trial judge abused his or her discretion. In Drummondv.
Drummond,119 for example, the court of special appeals
vacated the lower court's judgment after finding fault with
the inaction of the trial judge. In Drummond, the husband
had filed a complaint for absolute divorce in Maryland, but
Mrs. Drummond received service of the complaint in New
Jersey. According to Maryland Rule 2-321(b)(1), Mrs.
Drummond had sixty days after service to file her answer (as
opposed to the thirty day response time for in-state service).
When Mrs. Drummond did not respond within thirty days, an
order of default was entered against her despite the additional
time allotted to her under the rules. 2°
Mrs. Drummond requested that the court reconsider the
order of default, stating she was out of state and needed extra
time to retain a lawyer.' 2' She claimed that the order of
default was mailed to her parents' home in Atlantic City
where she no longer "commutted [sic] from.' 1 22 Despite
Mrs. Drummond's claim that she had not received the order
of default in a timely fashion after its entry, her motion was
denied. Mrs. Drummond then filed what appeared to be a
request for reconsideration concerning the error in the time
allotted for her answer. Although two hearings were held
before a master, that particular issue was not addressed.
Accordingly, the trial court granted an absolute divorce.
In vacating this judgment, the court of special appeals
held that "either the motion to set aside the default alone, or
taken together with the motion for reconsideration, contained
sufficient information to alert the trial judge that he needed
to look at the whole record."' 23 Although not citing any
authority for its position, the court believed that the trial
judge "either erred in failing to set aside the default based on
the first motion, or abused his discretion in denying the
motion for reconsideration.' ' 24 Drummond may be con-
strued as placing an obligation upon trial judges to review,
sua sponte, proceedings involving a pro se party for errors
or inconsistencies which would ordinarily be raised by
counsel. What remains to be seen is whether a trial judge is
under such an obligation only in cases where the party is
unable to obtain the assistance of counsel, as in Drummond,
or whether a trial judge must examine a record even where
both parties are assisted by counsel.
III. Conclusion
The decision whether or not to take sua sponte action can
prove to be an extremely difficult one for the trial judge. Not
acting when the judge should have acted could result in a
reversal; acting when he or she should not have acted could
precipitate a dismissal of the case based on double jeopardy
considerations. With these considerations in mind, trial
judges are encouraged to consider carefully the circum-
stances under which they are about to act, or refrain from
acting, on their own motion. They should conduct all
relevant inquiries into a particular matter before they decide
whether or not to make a sua sponte ruling. With the proper
level of well-informed foresight, trial judges can avoid the
pitfalls of sua sponte action.
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